Hunde Ibsa | March 15, 2015
Obbo Dima Nogo and addee Aster Gudina are dining at one of Cairo’s cafe right now being accompanied by Ahmed Hajmal and one more guy. Dima and Aster spent few nights in Sudan before they arrived in Cairo.
At it’s inception, the ODF leaders thought that they will be able to transform Ethiopia to something better but now they are struggling to figure out how to produce the intended result and reduce a sense of constant talk that the Oromo people have very little tolerance for. We don’t know why addee Aster had to join the the primary protagonists list but she is out there clapping to the ODF democratic dithering song, even though the bit of sense of accomplishment that they are clawing at has largely been eclipsed by the early outcome of the battle between the Amhara fanatics and the Tigre rulers.
As such, inattention to Ethiopia’s internal demons reflects a dangerous misreading of the empire’s evil past and current events by the ODF leaders who now struggle to set clear agenda so that each step they would take from now on could be simpler. What makes the ODF journey so complex is not only the conflict between what obbo Lenco called “the conflict between those who consider Ethiopia as country of nations vs. country of Amharic speaking people”. Rather it is the Oromo students ongoing protests and the TPLF repression that continued to activate the very deep and long-standing revolutionary feelings among the Oromo public in general. Hence, unless the ODF deals with the Oromo revolution and be able to legitimize itself as the lone representative of the Oromo voice, it can’t be taken as strong political entity that might be able to fix Ethiopia’s centuries-old divides and craft new institutions that can accommodate the nations and nationalities of the empire.
In addition to the above mentioned challenges, the fact that the Amharas are now primed to play a larger than usual role in empire’s political process since 1991 has huge implications on TPLF’s decision to use it’s military muscle, which I think would lead to some coalition formation between the TPLF and whoever is going to be stronger in the near future. For now, the TPLF has focused on dealing with Oromo student protests and few disagreements it had with certain segment of OPDO. But this time when the Arbanyoch-Ginbot 7 group are pushing hard through Gondar, potentially into Gojam, TPLF’s primary goal will shift from politics to military action. That means, the ODF ability to offer the TPLF useful opportunity to elevate the empire out of the looming crisis is very limited. Here, one needs to keep in mind that TPLF’s effort to silence the opposition would only discourage people from believing that they can bring the needed change via election.
Given the extent of fear that the Amharas have for the Oromo people and the Tigreans aspiration to remain a dominant political players in the horn of Africa, and adding ODF’s lack of representation of the Oromo voice contributes to the eventual decline of it’s influence. So far, the two Tigre factions, namely the Eritreans and the Tigrains in Finfinnee play huge role in the political game of Somalia, north and southern Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, even Rwanda. As of now, the divisions and infightings of the two Tigre tribes have led to the rise of the Amhara nationalism and their ability to influence the politics of the empire hangs on the strength of the Eritrean side Tigre group. In other words, the tipping of military balance to one side of the Tigre team would led to the rise or the decline of the Amharas ability to influence the politics of the empire. Contrary to this fact however, the Oromo will not suffer to such higher political threshold since the Oromo liberation movement does not entirely depend on the the two Tigre groups political cross fires. In other words, the chance of TPLF or EPLF falling off the threshold does not have the same implications it might have on the Amhara group for many reasons.
Firstly, since the foundation of the empire’s economy itself is Oromia, the collapse of the Eritrean government dose not have huge implication to stop the Oromo movement. Second, the collapse of the TPLF group will in fact create new incentives for the Oromo to rise and control their areas even if it has come down to the chopping off Oromia into regions or villages. By the same token, the Amharas will have very hard time to easily colonize Oromia as they did in the past.
Looking at these and other political scenarios of empire Ethiopia, the success of any of the current and future players could have unexpected implications for the ODF group. The only opportunity for the ODF to succeed found in the middle of the growing OLF influence and the opposition groups against the TPLF power if it continues to grow over the coming decades. If the TPLF and the EPLF remain in their current dominant positions fencing themselves by the opposition groups they help, the demand for the presence of the ODF team will shift from likely to less likely.
There is also a real possibility that the Oromo Federalist and other opposition groups control some 20-30% of the seat after this year’s election representing the Oromo voice. If that happened, the implications of such an outcome can be significant. In that case, the TPLF can express unwillingness to allow the ODF become part of it’s political game because adding it to the already growing Oromo voice would give the Oromo people a stronger influence in a system.
Mean time, such an outcome might alarm the Amhara group as one of the grave dangers against their interest, which it’s implication would change the entire political process. When such vicious political cycle develops, forming a coalition government becomes impossible. Therefore, the foundational problem is that in the situation where winning via election is not simply there, and where there are no signs of force that can put pressure on the TPLF to step down, there can be no change in the horizon. One way or the other though, catalysts for change will likely have to come from Oromia’s jungle.
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